Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth by Lynd, Staughton
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2
1979
Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth
Staughton Lynd
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Staughton Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396 (1979)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol29/iss2/4
Investment Decisions and the
Quid Pro Quo Myth
Staughton Lynd*
Under the quid pro quo doctrine, workers relinquish the right to strike in ex-
change for management's promise to submit contract grievances to arbitration.
While workers give up the right to strike over all grievances, management has to
arbitrate only those covered by the contract. As a result, management retains the
right to make investment decisions unilaterally, including those to close or relocate
plants. Mr. Lynd examines the legal remedies available to contest these decisions
andfnds them ineffective. After tracing the historical development of the quid pro
quo doctrine and exposing the asymmetry o/that bargain, the author offers two pro-
posals to remedy the inequity inherent in the bargain.
INTRODUCTION
RECENT PLANT CLOSINGS have shown clearly andpoignantly the helplessness of workers faced with a manage-
ment decision to relocate manufacturing facilities. The unilateral
nature of these investment decisions has also emphasized the im-
balance and inequity of the celebrated quid pro quo doctrine in
which workers voluntarily relinquish the right to strike in ex-
change for management's promise to submit contract grievances
to arbitration. Workers lose the right to strike over all problems,
while management agrees to arbitrate problems covered by the
contract but retains the right to make the investment decisions
unilaterally.
This article examines the legal remedies currently available to
contest these decisions and finds them ineffective. It then traces
the historical development of the quid pro quo doctrine, demon-
strates the asymmetry of that bargain, and concludes that the bar-
gain as enforced today by the courts is both historically inaccurate
and analytically unfair. Finally, the article proposes two methods
to resolve the unfairness inherent in the bargain. One is to give
workers a veto in investment decisions. The other is to recognize
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expressly that investment decisions are not part of the quid pro
quo in the collective bargaining agreement so that, while manage-
ment is free to shut down the plant, workers are free to strike in
response.
I. LAW IN PURSUIT OF THE RUNAWAY PLANT
Between 1960 and 1975, national manufacturing employment
rose by 8.3%. While manufacturing jobs increased by 43.3% in the
Southeast and 67% in the Southwest, they declined by 9.9% in
New England and 13.7% in the Mideast.' This massive relocation
of industry has hit workers in the older cities particularly hard:
Akron lost 24,000 manufacturing jobs in twenty-five years,2 New
York 647,000 within seven years,3 and Philadelphia nearly one-
quarter of its manufacturing jobs in less than five years.4
The statistics represent the effects of management decisions
concerning the reallocation of investment capital and the reloca-
tion of manufacturing plants. Management makes these decisions
unilaterally; the work force bears the impact individually and col-
lectively. Legal disputes over plant relocation, contracting out,
automation, scheduling, and successorship demonstrate the
human consequences of these decisions.-
The lawyer representing a union faced with a unilateral invest-
ment decision has a limited range of options.6 Assume a typical
collective bargaining agreement.' One clause recognizes the
union as bargaining agent,8 another provides for grievance arbi-
1. J. RIFKIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS
AND POWER IN THE 1980's, at 30, 33 (1978) (citing NORTHEAST/MIDWEST RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE, PROSPECTUS (1977)).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 31 (citing NORTHEAST/MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROSPECTUS
(1977)).
4. Id.
S. For a summary of leading cases in each category, see Gould, On Labor Injunctions
Pending Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REv. 533, 553 (1978).
6. These options can include issues arising from the effects of investment decisions
on, for example, the obligation to provide retiree health and life insurance, proration of
vacation pay, transfer of rights to a new plant, pension funding, and severance pay. This
article focuses, however, on the investment decisions themselves and not on their effects.
7. The clauses which follow are drawn from the contract of a union which the author
represented in a plant relocation case. The parties were GF Business Equipment, Inc. and
Local 1617, United Steelworkers of America.
8. "The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its em-
ployees for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment."
1979]
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tration,9 a third reserves to management exclusive rights to man-
age the company,' 0 and finally, a fourth states that the union
agrees not to strike during the term of the agreement.II Suppose
the company announces that it will move a department to another
state or permanently lay off 5,000 workers. What can the lawyer
do?
Two principal strategies have been attempted. One is to have
the decision set aside for failure to comply with the statutory duty
to bargain in good faith under section 8(a)(5) of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA);' 2 the other is to enjoin implementa-
tion of the decision until an arbitrator can decide whether it
violates the collective bargaining agreement.1
3
A. The Duty to Bargain in Advance About Investment Decisions
The NLRA imposes a mutual obligation on the employer and
the union to bargain in good faith.'4 The purpose is to require
parties to present and support their proposals in an attempt to
reach a common ground that can be embodied in a binding bilat-
eral agreement.' 5 The Act does not encourage fruitless marathon
discussion' 6 or require the parties to make counteroffers t7 or com-
promises 18 or reach agreements.' 9 It does, however, require the
9. "Should any dispute or disagreement arise between an employee and the Com-
pany as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this agreement, such dispute or
disagreement shall be handled" in arbitration.
10. "The Company retains the exclusive rights to manage the business and plant and
to direct the working forces. The Company, in the exercise of its rights, shall observe the
provisions of this agreement."
11. "The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, work stoppages, interruption,
impeding or concerted slowdown of work during the term of this agreement."
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). For text of the relevant provisions, see note 14 infra.
13. The language of the relevant portions of §§ 301(a)-301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act
are set out at note 49 infra.
14. Section 8(a)(5) obligates the employer by providing in part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees. ... 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(d) provides:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment. .. but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. ...
Id § 158(d)(5). An injunction may issue for refusing to bargain collectively as defined in
the Act. NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976).
15. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 399 (1976).
16. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
17. Id.
18. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides: "For the purposes of this [Act],
[Vol. 29:396
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parties to attempt to agree-that is, to bargain in good faith.2 °
Workers view the duty to bargain in good faith commonsensi-
cally. If management agrees to a strike settlement and shortly
thereafter announces an intention to leave town or suddenly in-
forms the union of a massive layoff while simultaneously releasing
the information to the press, the workers wonder what happened
to the employer's obligation to bargain. From the union's point of
view, the company should tell its workers in advance about
whatever difficulties it is experiencing. Employees should be
given an opportunity to suggest alternatives before management
announces a decision.
2
'
Technically, however, whether the duty to bargain in good
faith applies to an investment decision depends on whether the
decision is considered a mandatory subject of bargaining.22 In
1960, in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & North West-
ern Railway Co.,23 the Supreme Court held that a railroad's deci-
sion to close certain stations was a mandatory subject of
bargaining. The Chicago & North Western Railway had filed pe-
titions with the public utility commissions of four states in which
it operated requesting permission to close some stations and con-
solidate service at others. Prior to any decision by the commis-
sions, the union learned of the petitions and notified the railroad
to bargain collectively.. . does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. .. "
19. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
20. See id.; Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Mod-
ern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 293-310 (1978); Lynd, The
Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: 4 Study of Legislative
History, 5 IND. L.J. 720, 732 (1975). The author believes that the "contractualism" dis-
cussed in the text was always embedded in the Wagner Act; Klare believes that the concept
was grafted onto the Act after passage, much like the quid pro quo concept of the NLRA.
21. The Supreme Court has shown some sympathy for this view, noting that "the
rightful prerogatives of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even elimi-
nate themselves as employers should be balanced by some protection to the employees
from a sudden change in the employment relationship." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964) (compelling arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
that the Court held had survived the disappearance by merger of the corporate party).
"Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion with the union does amount to
a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and
must of necessity obstruct bargaining contrary to the congressional policy." NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (unilateral changes by employer in matters subject to pending
contract negotiations violated § 8(a)(5) duty to bargain collectively).
22. Section 8(d) not only imposes a duty to bargain in good faith but also requires the
parties to bargain over mandatory subjects, which include "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
23. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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that it wanted to negotiate to amend the bargaining agreement
with the following requested amendment: "No position in exist-
ence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued ex-
cept by agreement between the carrier and the organization."' 4
The railroad contended that it had no obligation to negotiate over
the amendment because an amendment request did not constitute
a "labor dispute" under the Railway Labor Act .2  The Supreme
Court disagreed. It held that the proposed amendment related to
"rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" and therefore was sub-
ject to the bargaining obligations imposed by the Act.26
Railroad Telegraphers prompted the National Labor Relations
Board to reconsider its position on the same issue-mandatory
bargaining over unilateral management decisions affecting job
rights and job security-under the NLRA. In Town & Country
Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,2 7 the Board held that the employer
had violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA 2  by discharging em-
ployees on the basis of antiunion animus and then subcontracting
their work. The Board also held that the employer had violated
section 8(a)(5)29 by failing to bargain over the subcontract, even if
its motives were purely economic.3" Then in Fibreboard Paper
24. Id. at 332.
25. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). The Act was intended inter alia.
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates
of pay, rules or working conditions; [and] to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules or working conditions.
Id. § 2(1)(4), (5), 29 U.S.C. § 151(a)(4), (5).
26. 362 U.S. at 339.
27. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
28. Section 8(a)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976).
29. See note 14 supra.
30. The Board's majority stated that the duty to bargain about a decision to subcon-
tract
in nowise restrains an employer from formulating or effectuating an economic
decision to terminate a phase of his business operations. Nor does it obligate him
to yield to a union's demand that a subcontract not be let, or that it be let on terms
inconsistent with management's business judgment. Experience has shown, how-
ever, that candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management fre-
quently results in their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides. Business
operations may profitably continue and jobs may be preserved. Such prior dis-
cussion with a duly designated bargaining representative is all that the Act con-
templates. But it commands no less.
136 N.L.R.B. at 1027 (footnote omitted).
Vol. 29:396
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Products Corp. v. NLRB,3 t the Board decided on the authority of
Railroad Telegraphers that the employer had violated its section
8(a)(5) duty to bargain by failing to bargain about a decision to
replace plant maintenance workers with workers outside the bar-
gaining unit who could be hired more cheaply. The Board held
that the employer was obligated to bargain not only about the ef-
fects of the decision to subcontract but also about the decision it-
self, even though the decision was motivated by a good faith
desire to effect economies.32 The Board stressed that its holding
merely required the employer to bargain, not to reach agree-
ment.33
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Fibreboard on nar-
rower grounds. The Court emphasized that its decision to require
bargaining over subcontracting was not to extend beyond "the
type of 'contracting out' involved in this case-the replacement of
employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an in-
dependent contractor to do the same work under similar condi-
tions of employment . . . . Moreover, the concurrence by
Justice Stewart stressed that many management decisions affect-
ing the conditions of employment by abolishing jobs were none-
theless not subject to the duty to bargain. Justice Stewart
cautioned that the Fibreboard holding should not be read as "im-
posing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. 35
Since the majority insisted that it was deciding nothing more than
the question of infringement of job rights before it and the concur-
rence attempted to insulate decisions "at the core of en-
trepreneurial control," it was difficult to tell how Fibreboard
affected the scope of mandatory bargaining. 6
In the years after Fibreboard, the Board found a duty to bar-
31. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), ar'g on rehearing, 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), enforced,
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), af'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
32. 138 N.L.R.B. at 554.
33. The Board emphasized that the issue in Fibreboard was
not, as stated in the dissent, "whether business management is free to subcontract
work in the interest of the more efficient operation of its business." Nor is the
Board majority holding, anymore than it did in the Town & Country case, that a
decision to subcontract is foreclosed to management unless it is a negotiated deci-
sion satisfactory to the union.
Id. at 551 (emphasis in original).
34. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
35. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Douglas and Harlan joined Justice
Stewart's concurrence.
36. The interpretation given Fibreboard is still controversial. For a discussion of the
present controversy, see Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L.
1979]
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gain over decisions that significantly affected employees. 37 Then
in 1971, after a change in its membership, the Board adopted the
doctrine of the Fibreboard concurrence 38 that management need
not bargain over decisions which affect the scope of the enterprise
or which involve a significant investment or withdrawal of capi-
tal.39 It has continued, however, to find a duty to bargain over
decisions to close one facility in an enterprise of two or more facil-
ities. °
The circuit courts of appeal have usually refused to enforce the
Fibreboard Board's understanding of the employer's duty to bar-
gain in advance over investment decisions.4' They have held in-
stead that an employer has a duty to bargain only over the effects
REV. 133 (1974); R. Swift, The NLRB and Management Decision Making (1974) (Labor
Relations and Public Series, The Wharton School, Report No. 9).
37. E.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1967). In that case the Board deter-
mined that three companies which manufactured, sold, and serviced refrigerated truck
bodies comprised a single, integrated, multiplant enterprise. Without notifying the union
or bargaining over the decision, one of the companies had decided to close a plant, which
was consuming excessive manpower and generating defective work. The Board held that
the logic of Fibreboard required bargaining since the closing was premised on production
inefficiencies, which were mandatory subjects of bargaining. It responded to the argument
that a partial closing decision "lies at the core of entrepreneurial control" by stating:
[A]n employer's decision to make a "major" change in the nature of his business,
such as the termination of a portion thereof, is also of significance for those em-
ployees whose jobs will be lost by the termination. For, just as the employer has
invested capital in the business, so the employee has invested years of his working
life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills that
may or may not be salable to another employer. And, just as the employer's
interest in the protection of his capital investment is entitled to consideration in
our interpretation of the Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection of
his livelihood.
Id. at 566.
38. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
39. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck and Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971),
enforced sub nom., UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sale and lease of enter-
prise facilities to dealership franchisee lay at core of entrepreneurial control and thus not
subject to mandatory bargaining).
40. See, e.g., Metro Trans. Servs. Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 534 (1975). But see Brockway
Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), denying enforcement of230 N.L.R.B.
1002 (1977). See also International Harvester Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 85 (1976), affirmed on
remand, 236 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 98 L.R.R.M. 1274 (June 5, 1977).
41. Compare ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 916 & n.20, 917, 921-22 (D.C. Cir.
1972) ("company's decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of
Fibreboard," and Board's decision seeking to restore status quo ante was "well suited to
remedying the violations found. ... ) with NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350
F.2d 191, 194-97 (3d Cir. 1965) (company's decision to relocate plant was economically
necessary and not mandatory subject of bargaining; order of Board denied and case re-
manded to Board to take evidence on effects of closing).
[Vol. 29:396
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of those decisions.42 Thus in general it can be said of Board and
court application of Fibreboard that the more seriously an invest-
ment decision affects the lives of workers, the less likely it is to be
held subject to the duty to bargain.
Even if courts were to impose mandatory bargaining over in-
vestment decisions, that remedy is a further frustration for work-
ers and their counsel.43 Perhaps the most radical aspect of the
Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard was that it upheld a Board
order declaring management's decision to subcontract null and
void and directing the restoration of the status quo ante so that the
parties could begin again." Such orders, however, are the excep-
tion, even in cases in which a violation of the duty to bargain is
found.15 But the real problem is that even where the employer is
found to have breached his duty to bargain, and even where the
Board's initial finding is enforced by the courts, and even where,
by that time, an effective remedy is still possible, even then, all
that the employer has to do is go through the motions of bargain-
ing and make the same decision a second time. Thus, the remedy
created by the Court in Fibreboard is procedural only. Frustrated
by the ineffectual remedies under the Act, the union's attorney is
likely to seek available remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement,4 6 especially that of enjoining the implementation of an
investment decision until arbitration.
42. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965).
43. In one case, the Board observed ruefully that the employer had breached § 8(a)(5)
by moving its production of portable electric typewriters from Springfield, Missouri, to
Hartford, Connecticut, but that by the time the case reached the Board on appeal, produc-
tion had been moved again-out of Hartford and overseas. Royal Typewriter Co., 209
N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), modffed, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976). Although the circuit court
supported the Board's findings, it maintained its rejection of the Ozark decision, 161
N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), in dictum, since there was no available remedy against the company.
533"F.2d at 1038-39.
44. 379 U.s. at 215-17. The order terminated the subcontract and reinstated the em-
ployees with backpay in their former jobs or in jobs substantially equivalent.
45. The NLRB will often restrain its full remedy powers - even where it finds a
violation of the duty to bargain. Restraint is most commonly applied when the employer's
decision is found to have been made for genuine economic reasons, not merely to avoid its
obligation to the union. See Rochet (Renton News Record), 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962). See
also R. GORMAN, supra note 15, at 534.
46. Not only may the contract provide more protection than the statute, but also, if an
arbitral grievance as well as a § 8(a)(5) charge is filed to protest an investment decision, the
Board may defer consideration of the charge until the grievance has run its course. Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). The Board has deferred on a § 8(a)(5) charge
when management had taken unilateral action not covered by any specific provision of the
contract. Radioear Corp. 199 N.L.R.B. 1161 (1972).
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B. The 'Reverse Boys Markets" Injunction
Historically the labor movement has opposed the use of in-
junctions.' 7 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills48 represented
a departure from this position. There the plaintiff union sought
an order to compel arbitration pursuant to section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley amendments. 49 The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and upheld the district court's order compelling arbitra-
tion." After the Lincoln Mills decision, the organized labor
movement favored injunctions compelling employers to arbitrate
while still opposing injunctions against strikes. Labor argued that
these positions were consistent because the employees remained
free to strike and the employer enjoyed his traditional freedom to
act prior to arbitration."
47. The congressional expression of this opposition was the 1932 enactment of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which stated in part:
No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or grow-
ing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this
Act; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be
issued contrary to the public policy declared in this Act.
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
48. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The plaintiff union had a collective bargaining agreement
with the employer which contained both a no-strike clause and a grievance arbitration
provision. Several grievances over work assignments and workloads were processed but
were ultimately denied by the employer. When the union requested arbitration, the em-
ployer refused. See notes 85-91 infra and accompanying text.
49. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The relevant portions of
§ 301 are as follows:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect
commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any
such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. ...
50. In his vigorous dissent, Justice Frankfurter characterized the union's resort to an
injunction as opportunistic and shortsighted--"intermittent yielding to expediency." 353
U.S. at 463 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He also stated: "It is not the first time that unions
have conveniently disregarded, when it suited an immediate end, ther eliement feelings
that secured the restriction upon the federal courts in granting in ctions in labor dis-
putes." Id. at 469 n.3. Justice Frankfurter was a principal drafman of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and co-author of the leading work on the subje ,F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
51. The AFL-CIO articulated the position as follows:
Under almost all collective agreements the employ r is free to act in the first
instance--to administer the agreement in accordan with his views as to its
meaning. The order to arbitrate does not enjoin him f\om so doing. It only re-
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Then, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 77052 gave em-
ployers the capacity to enjoin a strike,5 3 and unions reached out
for corresponding authority to enjoin unilateral employer action.5 4
Recognizing the importance of the arbitral process, some courts
were willing to require the employer to abide by the agreement
when "the shoe [was] on the other foot."55 These court orders
came to be known as "reverse Boys Markets injunctions" and gen-
erally prohibited employer action before arbitration. Such orders
were not unknown prior to Boys Markets,56 but they have become
more common in recent years.5 ' Lever Brothers Co. v. Interna-
tional Chemical Workers Local 21758 provides the best known ex-
ample of a reverse Boys Markets injunction.
In Lever Brothers, the company notified the union that it was
quires that he submit to an agreed-upon form of adjudication, after the fact, as to
whether his actions violated the agreement. The comparable order against a
union, alleged to have violated the agreement by striking, can only be an order
directing it to arbitrate, not an injunctive order preventing it from [striking] ...
Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 17, Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
52. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
53. In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court held that where a striking union did not
honor the employer's attempts at establishing arbitration under the collective bargaining
agreement that contained a no-strike clause, the district court had jurisdiction to grant an
injunction against the union under the Taft-Hartley Act. The Court, per Justice Brennan,
emphasized the narrowness of its holding. It stated that injunctive relief is available "only
with the situation in which a collective bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance
or arbitration procedure. . . .[I]t [does not] follow. . . that injunctive relief is appropri-
ate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance." Id. at
253-54. The Court set forth five prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction: (I) A
collective bargaining agreement must be in effect; (2) the agreement must contain a
mandatory arbitration procedure; (3) the dispute must be over a matter which is included
in the arbitration provision; (4) the employer must submit to arbitration as a condition to
the issuance of an injunction; and (5) the issuance of an injunction must meet the ordinary
principles of equity. Id. at 254.
54. See, e.g., District 50 Allied and Technical Workers v. Brockway Pressed Metals,
Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
55. Id. at 1260.
56. See, e.g., Local Div. 1098, Ass'n of St., Elec. R.R. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1963).
57. Eg., Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., No. 78-1270 (E.D.N.Y. June
12, 1978); Koster Bakeries v. Teamsters Local 802, 97 L.R.R.M. 2806 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Branch 998, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 88 L.R.R.M. 3524
(M.D. Ga. 1975); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 88
L.R.R.M. 2678 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F.
Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa.), remanded, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972); Technical Office and Pro-
fessional Workers Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Local 294, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers v. Three Rivers Indus., 78 L.R.R.M. 2090 (D. Mass. 1971); United
Steelworkers Local 1305 v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 636
(W.D. Pa. 1970).
58. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
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permanently closing its plant in Baltimore, Maryland, and trans-
ferring the work to its plant in Hammond, Indiana. The union at
the Baltimore facilities argued that the company's action consti-
tuted "outside contracting" under the collective bargaining agree-
ment since the Hammond plant was represented by a different
union.59
The union demanded that the company be ordered not to close
the Baltimore plant prior to arbitration. The district court granted
the union's request for a preliminary injunction and required the
union to post bond. The company's appeal to dissolve the injunc-
tion was unsuccessful, and although the union's grievance was ar-
bitrable, the arbitrator ruled against the union. Accordingly, the
injunction expired, but the company pursued its appeal, seeking
both a determination that the preliminary injunction was wrong-
fully issued and recovery on the bond. The Fourth Circuit held
that the district court had not abused its discretion by issuing a
preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending the out-
come of arbitration.6 ° It also upheld the district court's ruling that
the company could not recover on the bond without a judicial de-
termination that the injunction had been wrongfully issued.6
Enlarging the scope of Lever Brothers-type injunctions in-
volves both procedural and substantive problems.62 Procedurally,
a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order will be
granted only if the moving party satisfies traditional equitable
standards.63 These requirements have been embodied in section 7
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act6' and Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
59. The contracting-out clause of the contract gave the union nothing more than a
right to "due consideration by the Company to the rights of regular employees" before the
work was sent out. 554 F.2d at 118 n.1.
60. Id. at 120.
61. Id. The court elaborated on the necessity of issuing a reverse Boys Markets in-
junction in an addendum:
Further, the rule contained in this case is obviously a two-sided coin. An injunc-
tion to preserve the status quo pending arbitration may be issued either against a
company or against a union in an appropriate Boys Markets case where it is nec-
essary to prevent conduct by the party enjoined from rendering the arbitration
process a hollow formality in those instances where, as here, the arbitral award
when rendered could not return the parties substantially to the status quo ante.
Id. at 123. For an in-depth discussion of Lever Brothers, see Case Comment, Boys Markets
Injunctions Against Employers: Lever Brothers, Inc. v. Chemical Workers Local 217 [sic],
91 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1978).
62. Simon, Injunctive Relief to Maintain the Status Quo Pending Arbitration: A Union
Practitioner's View, N.Y.U. 29TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 317, 333 (1976).
63. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1056-61 (1965).
64. Section 7 provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
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dure 65.6" Some courts have required parties to meet a prelimi-
nary burden of demonstrating potential success on the merits of
their claim before an injunction pending arbitration may issue.
Yet, courts disagree on the degree of success a party must show.
The requirements have varied from "some likelihood of success" 6
6
to a minimal showing that the claim is not "plainly without merit"
so that arbitration would not amount to a "futile endeavor." 67
Even under the lesser standard a union may have difficulty
showing irreparable harm. A reduction in jobs which endangers
the personal safety of employees remaining on the job is clearly
irreparable harm.68 The loss of seniority recall rights or pension
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as
defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with op-
portunity for cross-examination) . . . and except after findings of fact by the
court, to the effect-
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless
restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no
injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat
or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or organiza-
tion making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or
ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will
follow,
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Preliminary Injunction
(I) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the
adverse party.
(6) Temporary Restraining Order, Notice; Hearing; Duration. A temporary
restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse
party or his attorney only if(1) it clearly appears. . . that immediate and irrepa-
rable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party
or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certi-
fies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the
notice and the reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be re-
quired. . . . On 2 days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary re-
straining order without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court
may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modifi-
cation and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such mo-
tion as expeditiously as the ends ofjustice require.
66. Hoh v. Pepsico Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. Transit Union Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (9th
Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 807 (1976) (expressly declining to
distinguish between "likelihood of success" and "plainly without merit"); accord, Lever
Bros., Co. v. International Chem. Workers Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (1976).
68. United Steelworkers Local 1305 v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., 319 F.
19791
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rights has been considered irreparable.69 If, however, the impend-
ing loss to the employees is simply loss of work or wages, the au-
thorities are divided on whether a subsequent award in damages
can make them whole. Many courts, including the Supreme
Court, have found that a management decision which "involves
the discharge of employees from positions long held and the dislo-
cation of others from their homes "70 causes irreparable
harm.7 Other courts have held to the contrary.72
Even if the union succeeds in showing that immediate imple-
mentation of the employer's decision would result in irreparable
harm, it must show in addition that the irreparable harm would be
greater should an injunction not issue than the irreparable harm
to the employer should relief be granted.73 This may be difficult
since the employer will usually be able to demonstrate financial
and economic damages to its business if an injunction issues.
Generally, however, courts have held an employer's potential
financial losses insufficient to deny the union's request for injunc-
tive relief " except where an injunction would hinder customer
service.75
Supp. 636, 641 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ("to the extent that defendant's action in reducing the
number of employees working at the open hearth furnaces threatens the health and safety
of the employees working on reduced crews, there is no adequate remedy either at law or in
arbitration .. ").
69. Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969, 978-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (recall rights-the court found no irreparable harm on other grounds);
Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 882 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(pension rights).
70. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528,
534 (1960).
71. See Technical Office and Professional Workers Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F.
Supp. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("Fourteen employees will be put out of work which would
cause a tremendous disruption in their personal lives and the personal lives of their fami-
lies. This is the type of harm which is irreparable."); Local Div. 1098, Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry.
& Motor Coach Employees v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1963)
("To make the transfer requires some of them to sell their homes, to move their families, to
incur considerable expense and obviously a great deal of inconvenience."). It should be
emphasized that the holding in the Lever Brothers addendum that a plant shutdown is
irreparable harm, 554 F.2d at 122, is consistent with the conclusion in Transit Union Div.
1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1977) (Greyhound 11), that
revising the work schedules of employees who are not displaced by a shutdown is not
irreparable harm.
72. Gallagher, Injunctions Restraining Employers Pending Arbitration: Equity and La-
bor Policy, 82 DICK. L. REv. 487, 495 n.60 (1978) and cases cited therein.
73. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976).
74. E.g., Communication Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
75. See, e.g., Hoh v. Pepsico Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1974); UAW Local 120 v.
Seagrave Fire Apparatus Div., 56 L.R.R.M. 2874, 2876 (E.D. Ohio 1964) (weighing "the
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A survey of successful reverse Boys Markets injunction cases
suggests that injunctions are granted when they impose on the em-
ployer only a very short delay prior to arbitration.7 6 Assume that
the union can surmount the two other procedural problems-that
the court requires the union to show merely that its contractual
claim is not frivolous and recognizes that irreparable harm will
result. Then, if arbitration is imminent, that will tip the balance of
equities in the union's favor. The substantive problems, however,
remain.
The substantive limitations of a reverse Boys Markets injunc-
tion pose greater problems for the union because the order pre-
serves the status quo only pending arbitration. In the long run, it
conveys no more authority to restrain plant relocation than the
arbitrator can draw from the essence of the contract. The limits of
Lever Brothers are the limits of Fibreboard. Unless the contract
contains something considerably more potent than the typical
clause prohibiting subcontracting, a Lever Brothers injunction
merely postpones defeat, which was exactly what happened upon
the expiration of the injunction in Lever Brothers: the employer
successfully relocated its plant.
Moreover, the reverse Boys Markets injunction approach pre-
supposes the typical absolute no-strike clause. It seeks to balance
the employer's ability to enjoin a work stoppage on the basis of
the no-strike clause with a corresponding union capacity to delay
investment decisions pending arbitration. 7 Thus, a successful
reverse Boys Markets injunction places even more power in the
hands of arbitrators and courts but leaves labor without the eco-
nomic leverage of its most effective weapon-the strike.78
consequences of lost jobs and all the miseries attendant to unemployment. . ." against the
company's "monetary losses in the continued operation of the Columbus plant, along with
possible inability to fill existing contracts and all the attendant losses ...").
76. Eg., Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 364 F. Supp. 875, 884-85
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (contract for sale of stores contained no clause binding successors and
assigns of employer, order issued with directive that selection of an arbitration panel be
completed within 10 days); Technical Office & Professional Workers Local 757 v. Budd
Co., 345 F. Supp. 42, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (employer laid off employees who refused em-
ployer's offer to transfer from Pennsylvania to Michigan; court enjoined employer for 15
days to seek an "ultimate resolution" in arbitration); Local Div. 1098, Ass'n of St., Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D.D.C.
1963) (repair shop to transfer from District of Columbia to Illinois; "[tihe only effect of the
injunction so far as the [employer] is concerned would be a few weeks' delay.").
77. See notes 66-76 supra and accompanying text.
78. This new balance of power would be in labor's best interest only if contractual
language in collective bargaining agreements curbing management prerogatives were much
stronger than it currently is in typical agreements.
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In the present state of the law, an attorney is virtually power-
less to prevent plant closings or relocations, whether through the
grievance procedure, the Board, or the courts. Arbitrators and
judges are properly bound to enforce whatever the parties include
in their collective bargaining agreement. The courts have refused
to enforce the Fibreboard doctrine, which would superimpose on
the parties the statutory duty to bargain in advance about invest-
ment decisions affecting job security.7 9 Labor's efforts to enjoin
unilateral investment decisions pending arbitration have had
quixotic success: victory merely postpones the employer's plans.
Substantive rabbits cannot be magically extracted from procedu-
ral hats. Thus, the answer must be to change the collective bar-
gaining agreements themselves.
II. THE QUID PRO Quo MYTH
The recent wave of plant closings and relocations8 ° not only
reveals the inadequacy of the legal weapons available to labor, but
also lays bare a fundamental unfairness in American labor rela-
tions. In the typical collective bargaining agreement, labor relin-
quishes its most effective weapon against management-its ability
to strike. Yet in the typical agreement, management retains the
prerogative to disrupt the lives of its employees by relocating or
closing its facilities.8" So long as this power is latent, the inequity
is not perceived. As one president of a local steelworkers union
recently stated, "In everything we did, we always assumed the mill
would be there."82 The conglomerate owning the mill had in-
formed the president that he could expect the mill to be closed in
eighteen months. Such experiences should prompt workers and
their advocates to reevaluate the doctrine that the collective bar-
gaining agreement is a quid pro quo.
The Norris-LaGuardia and National Labor Relations Acts
were expressly predicated on the inequality of bargaining power
between employee and employer.83 The underlying assumption
79. See notes 31-42 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
81. These clauses in a typical collective bargaining agreement are set out in notes 10
and 11 supra.
82. Conversation with Ed Mann, President of Local 1462, United Steelworkers of
America (Aug. 1978). Mann is leading a struggle to prevent Jones & Laughlin from shut-
ting down the Brier Hill Works in Youngstown.
83. "[U]nder prevailing economic conditions [of corporate ownership] . . . the indi-
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
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of American labor law since the 1930's, evidenced in both Acts,
has been that the right to bargain collectively equalizes the bar-
gaining power of employee and employer.84 This thesis would fall
were courts to closely examine the actual extent of liberty that
rank-and-fie workers have to determine the content of their con-
tracts . 5 Courts assume nonetheless that labor and management
come to the bargaining table as equals. This is the indispensable
premise of the doctrine that the collective bargaining contract is
the product of an equal exchange: a quid pro quo.
The quid pro quo concept was suggested to the Supreme Court
in the union's brief in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.86
There the union sought specific performance of the employer's
contractual promise to arbitrate grievances, but had to overcome
the common law rule against specific performance of an agree-
ment to arbitrate. 87 The union surmounted this problem by dis-
tinguishing commercial arbitration from labor arbitration. The
petitioner noted that commercial arbitration usurped the courts'
traditional jurisdiction because it substituted for litigation.88 On
the other hand, arbitration under collective bargaining agreements
substituted for the strike.89
employment .. " Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 102 (1976)). "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce. ... NLRA, ch. 198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
84. "Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organ-
ize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce. . . by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees." NLRA, ch. 198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
85. See generally W. SERRIN, THE COMPANY AND THE UNION: THE "CIVILIZED RE-
LATIONSHIP" OF THE GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AND THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE
WORKERS (1973).
86. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See notes 48-50 supra.
87. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
88. Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 32, 35. "Whatever the formula in the individual labor agreement, the same
pattern appears. The agreement to arbitrate grievances is the concomitant of the agree-
ment not to strike; the arbitration process is the substitute for the strike and the picket line
in settling questions of application of the agreement." Id. at 34. The American Arbitration
Association also advocates this distinction. Summarizing the relationship between judicial
tribunals and grievance arbitration, a speaker for the Association stated:
It is of first importance that in dealing with arbitration, whether legislatively or
judicially, it should be recognized that this is not litigation in the conventional
sense. Nor is it a substitute for litigation. It is a procedure specifically designed to
meet the need for a substitute for strike. ...
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The union argued that whether arbitration was indeed a quid
pro quo for waiver of the right to strike could be determined only
by an inquiry into the intention of the parties to a particular con-
tract. As it happened, the Lincoln Mills contract embodied a gen-
uine quid pro quo of the kind posited. In contrast to most labor
agreements, the contract contained an article dealing with both
arbitration and strikes.9" The article gave "authority to the em-
ployer to discharge employees who engage in work stoppages or
slowdowns during the term of the agreement 'as a result of the
failure of an employee to exhaust all grievance procedures avail-
able under the contract.' "91 Moreover, evidently the union
agreed not to strike only over matters which the employer agreed
to arbitrate: "Union action to prevent and secure the termination
of strikes is specified in cases in which they occur over grievances
which are 'arbitrable under the contract'."'92
The Supreme Court adopted the union's quid pro quo argu-
ment with enthusiasm, yet failed to develop fully the doctrinal un-
derpinnings. The majority's inquiry began with an analysis of the
legislative intent of section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act.93 Concluding the historical survey with the premise
that recognition of the labor agreement as a valid and binding
contract would confer greater responsibility on the parties to the
contract and ultimately promote industrial peace, Justice Douglas
surmised that "[p]lainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."'94 In that
statement Justice Douglas abruptly transferred attention from the
Id. at 36. See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
It is especially noteworthy, in view of what the Supreme Court was to do with this idea,
that the union brief in Lincoln Mills stressed that a union might or might not choose to
settle the kind of problem involved in the case (unilateral changes in work loads during the
term of an agreement) by arbitration. "Two avenues of limitation are possible: I) the
right to strike to protest against changes in work loads (as in the automobile industry) or
2) an agreement to arbitrate under general principles of equity and fairness. Theparties
here chose the second route." Brief for Petitioner at 38, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (emphasis added).
90. The union's brief does not supply the full contract language, but notes that "[tihe
Article begins by stating that the employer and the union agree that the procedures pro-
vided in the article are adequate to provide a fair and final determination of all grievances
and that therefore they both agree that strikes and work stoppages should be avoided."
Brief for the Petitioner at 37, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
94. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
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intent of Congress in drafting section 301 to the intent of the par-
ties in the collective bargaining agreement. While Justice Douglas
considered Congress' intent at length, 95 there is absolutely no dis-
cussion of the parties' intentions. It is these intentions, and not the
legislative history, that the Court should have analyzed to deter-
mine whether a quid pro quo existed in fact.
Attempting to explain the Court's rationale, Justice Douglas
stated: "[T]he entire tenor of the history indicates that the agree-
ment to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro
quo of a no-strike agreement." 96 "The history" alludes, not to the
history of collective bargaining between the union and Lincoln
Mills, but to the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. Those
who "considered" the agreement to arbitrate grievances a quid
pro quo for a no-strike provision were not the workers and corpo-
rate executives who made the agreement, but congressmen. Thus,
in two sentences the Court abandoned a fundamental inquiry of
the law of contracts: the inquiry into what the parties actually
intended to achieve by their agreement.97
A. Genesis of the No-Strike, Binding Arbitration Tradeoff
The arrangement rationalized by the quid pro quo doctrine
originated not by contract but by force, as an aspect of govern-
mentally imposed labor peace during World War 11.98 David
Feller, who as attorney for the United Steel Workers of America
95. Id. at 448-59.
96. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
97. Justice Black excoriated this approach to collective bargaining agreements in his
dissent in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 106 (1962) (Black, J.,
dissenting). He explained that the Court made up contract terms "out of clear air, so far as
I can see," so that its decision "actually vacates and amends the contract that the parties
themselves had made and signed .. ." Id. at 107. "1 had supposed . . . that the job of
courts enforcing contracts was to give legal effect to what the contracting parties actually
agree to do, not to what courts think they ought to do." Id. at 108. "Section 301 is torn
from its roots when it is held to require the sort of compulsory arbitration imposed by this
decision." Id. at 110.
98. An initial observation should lead one to suspect the historical accuracy of the
quid pro quo doctrine as a voluntary tradeoff: working people do not perceive arbitration
as helpful and certainly not so helpful as to be worth the right to strike. A steelworker with
25 years in the mill has described the grievance-arbitration system as "Five Steps to Fail-
ure." C. SPENCER, BLUE COLOR: AN INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF THE WORKPLACE 134
(1977). As he tells the story, grievances are routinely kicked upstairs from Step One, where
the grievant confronts his or her own foreman, to Step Two, where the superintendent who
told the foreman what to do in the first place denies the grievance again. Id. at 134-36. If
the grievance is appealed further, after a year or two it reaches Step Three. "In Step Three,
the grievance becomes more depersonalized. The aggrieved worker and the boss have been
eased out of it. It has become a matter between the company's industrial relations officers
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did much to promote the quid pro quo idea, provides the clearest
account of the genesis of no-strike and arbitration provisions.99
Feller notes that the accepted method of resolving labor disputes
in the early 1930's was the strike; fewer than ten percent of the
contemporaneous labor agreements provided for arbitration.1°°
Although early contracts between the Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations and such major corporations as General Motors and
United States Steel contained language which resembled today's
no-strike and arbitration clauses, in actuality strikes abounded
and arbitration occurred rarely and only by mutual agreement.',t
Moreover, the organized labor movement itself remained deeply
and the chairman of the union's grievance committee." Id. at 137. The author describes
Step Three as follows:
Industrial relations people come to Step Three with attache cases filled with
past arbitration decisions, grievance settlements that bear the union's signature,
copies of local agreements agreed to by the union, and a dossier on the aggrieved
worker, all lined up to sustain the company's position. What new weapon does
the union representative have to beat down the company's massive defenses?
Nothing that wasn't previously demonstrated in Steps One and Two. The facts in
the grievance don't change. History is on the side of the company ....
Id. at 138. The decision whether to appeal the grievance from Step Three to Step Four is
made not by the grievant, or even by any member of the grievant's local union, but by a
staff representative for the international union. The staff representative's decision is final.
Usually he decides not to appeal the grievance, "often for strategic reasons unexplained
either to the worker or to the local union." Id. If the staff man decides to appeal the
grievance, Step Four proceedings will be initiated 6 to 12 months later. No new informa-
tion is available at Step Four, only the decisionmakers, now the company's industrial rela-
tions superintendent, a corporation attorney, and the international union representative are
new. All are "one more step removed from the workplace." Id. at 139. The only remain-
ing option for the grievant is Step Fie-arbitration. Many unions are too poor ever to
arbitrate a grievance. Even for the richest, arbitration is a costly luxury. Spencer notes that
more than 500 grievances were filed each year in his local union; only two percent reached
arbitration. Id. at 141.
Spencer comes to the following conclusions about arbitration as he has watched it dur-
ing his working life:
There is a widespread impression that in a plant where arbitration is provided
for in the union contract, that, ultimately, all disputes are settled by an arbitrator,
to the satisfaction of all concerned parties. . . .A closer look at the workplace
shows that arbitration-the final step in the pyramid of grievance procedure-has
failed to satisfy the worker or to fulfill the union's promise of a fair and equitable
system for settling their disputes with the management.
Id. at 140. If this acid portrait is even remotely reflective of the rank-and-file view of
arbitration, it makes no sense to suppose that workers have voluntarily waived their right
to strike in exchange for grievance arbitration.
99. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
663, 745-47 (1973).
100. Id. at 745.
101. id. at 746 n.364. For example, only two grievances were arbitrated under the
collective bargaining agreement between General Motors and the United Automobile
Workers from 1937 to 1940. See Harbison, Steel, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, How
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKs 508 (1942).
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ambivalent over submitting grievances to arbitration.1
02
Grievance arbitration provisions became widely used as a re-
sult of the activity of the War Labor Board.1 3 In December 1941,
the month of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt convened a La-
bor-Management Conference which agreed upon a resolution to
prohibit strikes and lockouts for the duration of the war. The
President also established a War Labor Board to resolve griev-
ances.104
The strike could therefore no longer be tolerated as even an
optional terminal point of the grievance procedure. And so,
"the Board insisted, as a matter of paramount importance,
upon arbitration as the final step of [the] grievance procedure."
As a result, the system of grievance arbitration as we now know
it was created. 'o0
This mandatory quid pro quo was not welcomed by workers.
On the contrary, it prompted a strike wave statistically compara-
ble to the wave of the 1930's.116 Union officials used union funds
"to enforce the directives of the National War Labor Board
which, in the first instance, [the workers did] not believe in."' 07
The officials repeatedly imposed various sanctions-"members
suspended or expelled, locals put in receivership or charters lifted,
company firing and draft board induction of strikers and local of-
102. For example in 1938, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union agreed to industry-wide arbitration over any conflict arising from the interpretation
of their contract. The American Federation of Labor immediately denounced the union's
agreement and "expressed its unalterable opposition to 'compulsory arbitration clauses in
agreements'. ... Id. at 746 n.363 (quoting Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 3 L.R.R.M.
1071, 1072 (1939)).
103. Feller, supra note 57, at 746. ("[The real explosion in the number of provisions
for grievance arbitration, and in large measure the forms which those provisions took...
came as a result of the activity of the War Labor Board.").
104. Id. at 746-47.
105. Id. at 747 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD TERMI-
NATION REPORT 113 (1948)).
106. M. Glaberman, The Struggle Against the No-Strike Pledge in the UAW During
World War II (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Institute for Policy Studies (Washington,
D.C.)). Glaberman cites the following statistics to demonstrate the similarity between the
strike wave of the mid-1940's and that of the 1930's. The statistics are taken from Work
Stoppages Caused by Labor-Management Disputes in 1945, 62 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 718,
720 (1946).
Year No. of strikes No. of workers involved
1937 4,740 1,860,621
1944 4,956 2,115,637
1945 4,750 3,467,000
107. B. COCHRAN, LABOR AND COMMUNIsM: THE CONFLICT THAT SHAPED AMERI-
CAN UNIONs 201 (1977).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ficers ratified-so that there existed in a number of CIO unions a
state of warfare between large sections of the membership and
high union officials."' 8
The conclusion drawn from a review of the historical context
from which the quid pro quo doctrine emerged is that the no-
strike/arbitration tradeoff is a child of martial, industrial necessity
imposed upon a reluctant rank and file. The question is why, if
historically the quid pro quo was both imposed and unpopular, it
continued in collective bargaining agreements when the war en-
ded. There appear to be two reasons. First, the quid pro quo ben-
efits unions, even if it does not benefit their members
individually. °9 A second, more subtle answer is that plant clos-
ings were relatively rare in the expanding economy of the post-
war years. The collective bargaining agreement appeared to offer
an equal exchange: the worker could not strike, but could arbi-
trate his own discharge. Moreover, during World War II con-
tracts had commonly come to include clauses requiring just cause
for discharge."' The additional mandatory inclusion of a just
cause standard probably crystallized the assumption that labor
could justly be asked to relinquish its most effective weapon, the
strike, since management had been required to place the power of
reviewing its own final decision, discharge, in the hands of arbitra-
tors. This assumption fails, however, when management unilater-
ally makes investment decisions. A plant closing puts a person
out of a job as effectively as a firing, and the present state of the
law provides no way to arbitrate whether a plant closure or reloca-
tion was for a just cause.
B. The Asymmetry of the Exchange
The quid pro quo doctrine presumes a mythical waiver which
never in fact took place. An even more serious difficulty for the
vitality of the doctrine is the nature of the bargain itself. Manage-
ment, while agreeing to arbitrate some problems covered by the
contract, reserves the right to decide all other problems unilater-
ally."'I Labor, while obtaining the opportunity to submit some
108. Id. at 201.
109. A full exploration of this theme would go far beyond the boundaries of this article.
110. "IT]he Board regularly ordered their inclusion in collective agreements in cases
that came before it. . . . Even when the parties had no agreement for arbitration or no
just.cause clause, the Board established a policy of referring disputes concerning discipline
to arbitration for decision under a just cause standard." Summers, Indiidual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal" Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499 n.103 (1976).
111. See note 10 supra.
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problems to arbitration, relinquishes the right to strike about all
problems whatsoever. This asymmetry can be represented by the
following matrix:
Problems covered Problems not coy-
by the contract ered
by the contract
Management Gives up freedom Retains freedom
of action of action
Labor Gives up freedom Gives up freedom
of action of action
The imbalance of the bargain is only too obvious; yet the reali-
ties of the situation-so unsettling to the assumptions of court-
created national labor policy-have received little acknowledge-
ment from the courts.
Since Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court has applied the quid
pro quo doctrine to a series of particular collective bargaining
agreements. The results have been strained because of the Court's
commitment to the assumption that the quid and the quo of a
given contract are equal. Hence, both in the rare case in which
management's commitment to arbitrate is more sweeping than the
union's commitment not to strike" 2 and in the typical case in
which the union has an absolute duty not to strike but manage-
ment reserves extensive management prerogatives," 3 the Court
has tried to make the equation balance despite the obvious intent
of the parties. Moreover, the Court has evaluated these contracts
with the substantive terms of a paradigmatic contract in mind:
"Complete effectuation of the federal policy. . . is achieved when
the agreement contains both an arbitration provision for all un-
resolved grievances and an absolute prohibition of strikes, the ar-
bitration agreement being the 'quid pro quo' for the agreement
not to strike."" 4 This formulation conceals an inherent ambiguity
in the meaning of "grievances." If a grievance is any dispute be-
tween the parties, then the arbitration clause becomes coextensive
112. E.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
113. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These three cases are commonly re-
ferred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
114. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 n.4
(1960).
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with the no-strike clause. But if a grievance is a dispute concern-
ing only the terms of the agreement, then the commitment to arbi-
trate is less extensive than the commitment not to strike.
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 5 the
first case in the Steelworkers Trilogy,"6 the arbitration clause
committed the parties to arbitrate all disputes "as to the meaning,
interpretation and application of the provisions of the
agreement."" I 7 The contract also contained a typical management
prerogatives clause, reserving for management "the direction of
the working force, plant layout and routine of work, including the
right to [hire and fire] and to lay off employees because of lack of
work .. ."118 The contract unambiguously provided for arbitra-
tion only over grievances arising from the terms of the contract.
The Court, however, construed the arbitration clause as if it en-
compassed all disputes of any kind. The agreement, the Court
stated,
is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that a
court may deem meritorious. There is no exception in the "no
strike" clause and none therefore should be read into the griev-
ance clause, since one is the quidpro quo for the other....
Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehi-
cle for handling every and all disputes that arise under the
agreement. '9
Thus, the Court's position was that any party who claimed that a
grievance was based on the contract had a right to have the claim
arbitrated.' 20
The second case, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co.,' 2' posed the problem more sharply. The contract
there stated that differences "as to the meaning and application of
the provisions of this Agreement" and differences over "any local
trouble of any kind" should not occasion suspension of work but
should be submitted to a grievance process culminating in binding
arbitration. 2 2 But the contract also stated: "[M]atters which are
strictly a function of management shall not be subject to arbitra-
115. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
116. See note 113 supra.
117. 363 U.S. at 565 n.1 (emphasis added).
118. Id. n.2.
119. Id. at 567.
120. Id. at 568-69. The Court concluded that the "processing of even frivolous claims
may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment
may be quite unaware." See also id. at 571 (Brennan & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
121. 363 U.S. 575 (1960).
122. Id. at 576.
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tion."' 23 Moreover, the evidence established that during the pre-
vious nineteen years management had been contracting out the
type of work involved in the grievance and that the union had
been attempting, unsuccessfully, to change the contract to limit
the employer's right to contract out.' 94 Both the district court and
the court of appeals held that contracting out fell within the man-
agement prerogatives clause and was not subject to arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed. It emphasized the fundamental role
that both collective bargaining and arbitration play in promoting
industrial peace and resolved the issue before it in favor of arbi-
trability. 12
5
The Court came very close to saying that the dispute had to be
arbitrable: "When. . .an absolute no-strike clause is included in
the agreement, then in a very real sense everything that manage-
ment does is subject to the agreement, for either management is
prohibited or limited in the action it takes, or if not, it is protected
from interference by strikes."' 26 The Court hastened to add that it
"[did] not mean. . . that the language, 'strictly a function of man-
agement,' has no meaning."' 27 Yet the Court did in effect strip the
phrase of all practical interpretations in holding that it "must be
interpreted as referring only to that over which the contract gives
management complete control and unfettered discretion."'
' 2 8
Thus, the phrase did not in itself make any problem unarbitrable
unless the contract also had an "express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration."' 29 Justice Whittaker, dis-
senting, protested, 13 and even Justices Brennan and Frankfurter,
123. Id. at 588 (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
125. "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpre-
tation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."
Id. at 582-83. "In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail .. " Id. at 584-85.
126. Id. at 583. The sentence is not a model of clarity. On the verge of a declaration
that management must have committed itself to arbitrating everything because the contract
forbade all strikes, the Court stopped short with trivial semantics--everything management
does is "subject to the agreement" because either the agreement restricts management's
freedom of action or else the agreement restricts labor's right to restrict management's free-
dom of action, and in either case, management is "subject" to the agreement.
127. Id. at 583-84.
128. Idat 584.
129. Id. at 584-85.
130. Id. at 589 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). Justice Whittaker pinpointed the Court's
underlying methodology: "I understand the Court. . .to hold. . . that when, as here, the
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concurring, asked: "If a court may delve into the merits to the
extent of inquiring whether the parties have provided that con-
tracting out was a 'function of management,' why was it error for
the lower court here to evaluate the evidence of bargaining history
for the same purpose?"'
13 1
The premise that the collective bargaining agreement contains
an exchange of equally broad promises-a quid pro quo-also
provides the basis for the Court's corollary doctrine of an implied
no-strike clause. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,132
the contract contained provisions for grievance arbitration and for
termination of an employee for unsatisfactory work. The union
struck to protest an employee's discharge, and later the arbitrator
found the discharge justified. In the interim the employer brought
suit for damages to his business attributable to the strike. The
Supreme Court considered the argument that the union could not
have engaged in an illegal strike "in the absence of a no-strike
clause in the contract explicitly covering the subject of the dispute
over which the strike was called." '133 Rejecting the argument, the
Court implied an agreement not to strike over anything the union
had agreed to arbitrate: "[A] contrary view would be completely
at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation to pro-
mote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare."' 34
Following the rationale in Lucas Flour, the court implied a no-
strike clause in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW.135 The collective bar-
gaining agreement contained language similar to that in Warrior
& G;/136 the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes about "local
trouble of any kind." The Court held that, absent any express
language limiting the no-strike commitment, "the agreement to
arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having
coterminous application."' 37 Thus, when the union in Gateway
Coal went out on strike over allegedly unsafe working conditions,
contract contains a no-strike clause, everything that management does is subject to arbitra-
tion." Id. (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 572 (Brennan & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
132. 369 U.S. 95, 95, 104-06 (1962).
133. Id. at 104-05.
134. Id. at 105. The Court's rationale flies in the face of explicit language in the arbi-
tration clause providing "that during such arbitration, there shall be no suspension of
work." Id. at 96. It is evident from this language that the parties must have bargained over
a no-strike clause and adopted the preceding language as a compromise.
135. 414 U.S. at 382.
136. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
137. 414 U.S. at 382.
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they were held to have violated an implied agreement not to strike
over "any local trouble of any kind."
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers1 38 is the most recent
decision interpreting the quid pro quo doctrine. Its importance is
that the five-Justice majority and the four-Justice minority con-
fronted the underlying problem in the doctrine: management's
prerogative makes the collective bargaining agreement unequal.
Justice White, for the majority, recognized this by redefining the
quid pro quo doctrine. Justice Douglas had announced the doc-
trine in Lincoln Mills--"the agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."' 139
Justice Brennan repeated in Boys Markets that "a no-strike obli-
gation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking
by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of
arbitration."'" In Buffalo Forge, Justice White added nine mo-
mentous words: "The quid pro quo for the employer's promise to
arbitrate was the union's obligation not to strike over issues that
were subject to the arbitration machinery."'' These words rede-
fine fairness in a collective bargaining agreement. Henceforth, a
collective bargaining agreement will be held fair and properly
characterized as a quid pro quo if the employer agrees to arbitrate
everything over which labor agrees not to strike, or conversely, if
labor reserves its right to strike over matters which management
refuses to submit to arbitration.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Buffalo Forge conceded the inequal-
ity in the ordinary labor contract. He stated that "in many collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, the employer has agreed to
mandatory arbitration only in exchange for a no-strike clause that
extends beyond strikes over arbitrable disputes."'42 Nevertheless
138. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
139. 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
140. 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
141. 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 418-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For support, Justice Ste-
vens cited an article by David Feller, counsel for the union in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
The arbitration provision in the collective agreement has frequently been de-
scribed by the Supreme Court as the quid pro quo for the agreement not to strike.
Although the characterization is accurate insofar as it reflects the historical devel-
opment. . . in only a few agreements does it describe an equivalence... . The
great majority of industrial collective agreements contain . . . a prohibition of
strikes to protest any employer conduct, whether or not the conduct is limited by
the rules contained in the collective agreement. . . [The no-strike provisions of
most collective agreements constitute a quo considerably in excess of the quid of
the agreement to arbitrate.
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he argued that such contracts should be enforced because, first,
that is what Congress directed in section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 143 second, presumably the parties freely
entered the agreements,'" and third and most important, only by
enforcing the no-strike clause of such contracts could the Court
effectuate the "policy of motivating employers to agree to binding
arbitration by giving them an effective 'assurance of uninterrupted
operation during the term of the agreement.' ,145
Justice White, on the other hand, was concerned that the recip-
rocal commitments of labor and management be equal and ar-
gued that a contract which reduces unequal commitments to
writing cannot be fairly described as a quid pro quo. While it is
important that Justice White implicitly redefined what the quid
pro quo should be, the fact remains that in at least sixty per cent of
existing collective bargaining agreements the no-strike clause is
broader than the arbitration clause. 14 6 Thus, the quid pro quo
doctrine can no longer legitimize that disparity between the par-
ties' obligations.
In the aftermath of Buffalo Forge, one circuit court has con-
cluded that the implied promises as well as the express promises of
the parties to collective bargaining agreements are unequal. In
Transit Union Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound
1),147 the Ninth Circuit explained the quid pro quo doctrine:
While a promise to submit a dispute to arbitration may justify a
finding of an implied duty not to strike ...such a promise
does not imply a duty on the part of the employer to preserve
the status quo pending arbitration. The source of this differ-
ence is that a strike pending arbitration generally will frustrate
and interfere with the arbitral process while the employer's al-
tering the status quo generally will not.' 48
The court's acknowledgement shows that the quid pro quo
doctrine has ceased to perform its original function of rational-
izing inequality. It also shows that courts are no longer seeking to
Feller, supra note 99, at 757-60.
143. 428 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 425 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 423-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Feller, supra note 99, at 759 n.408. Thus, Justice Stevens was correct in introduc-
ing his dissent with the following statement: "A contractual undertaking not to strike is the
union's normal quidpro quo for the employer's undertaking to submit grievances to bind-
ing arbitration," 428 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
147. 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
148. Id. at 1238-39 (citation omitted).
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present the collective bargaining agreement as fair and equal;1 4 9
rather, they are using the phrase "quid pro quo" as a synonym for
national labor policy. In so doing, the courts impose a no-strike
clause on labor whether fair or not.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The typical collective bargaining agreement is unequal. It
forces labor to give up its right to strike in all cases yet enables
management to retain the right to make unilateral investment de-
cisions. The available remedies are merely procedural. Gener-
ally, management need only go through the motions of bargaining
or maintain the status quo until after arbitration. The remedies
postpone labor's defeat; they do not avoid it. The only way to
correct the present realities is to change the content of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
How should the contract be changed? What direction should
be recommended for changing the terms of the typical collective
bargaining agreement? There are two possibilities.
A. Expanding the Quid: Management Agrees to Arbitrate
Investment Decisions
The first possibility is to give workers a voice in investment
decisions. This may be accomplished in more than one way. An
approach currently being explored by the Ecumenical Coalition of
the Ohio Mahoning Valley would enable employees to block ad-
verse investment decisions by giving them sufficient voting power
in the management of the corporation. The management scheme
proposed to the Coalition by the National Center for Economic
Alternatives would allow the local community (through a commu-
nity development corporation), private investors, and employees
(through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan) each to select ap-
proximately one-third of a corporation's board of directors. Al-
though workers would have less than a majority voice in this
proposal, the corporation by-laws could be drafted so that the
149. Another example of the attitude that any change in the existing labor-manage-
ment imbalance must be wrong, because it represents a departure from the quid pro quo, is
the dissenting opinion of Member Penello in Gould Corp. v. James P. Moran, 237
N.L.R.B. No. 124, 99 L.R.R.M. 1059 (Aug. 25, 1978). According to Member Penello,
preventing the employer from selectively disciplining union officers for their role in wildcat
strikes would endanger "the grievance-arbitration, no-strike tradeoff' which is "the very
foundation of our collective-bargaining system." Id. at 1064 (Penello, Member, dissent-
ing).
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votes controlled by employees would be more than enough to pro-
tect their job security.
A more conventional, though still uncommon, approach is to
negotiate contract language radically restricting management's
control over investments. For example, 5 ° the United Shoe Work-
ers negotiated, and an arbitrator and federal court enforced, a
clause that prevented an employer from moving his factory from
the county in which it was located.' Clothing workers in New
York City obtained and enforced contract language that gave a
"joint board" the authority to prohibit an employer from not only
moving his plant from the city but also from manufacturing gar-
ments in another factory. 5 2 An innovative restriction from a 1936
agreement read: "No member of the association shall, during the
term of this agreement, move his shop or factory from its present
location to any place beyond which the public carrier fare is more
than 5 cents."' 53
Obtaining such contract language is, however, a serious practi-
cal problem. Plant relocations are generally considered permis-
sive subjects of bargaining. 54 Consequently, a union has no right
to insist to impasse on contract language restricting the employer's
power to shut down or remove plants. A strike called to obtain
such language would be unprotected activity.' 5l The scope of a
no-strike clause, on the other hand, is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.'56 Therefore, the only protected way for unions to obtain
150. A study by attorneys Matt Robbins and Leonard Page provided these examples.
M. Robbins & L. Page, Plant Shutdowns (Feb. 14, 1978) (unpublished paper on file with
the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
151. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 568, 569 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afj'd, 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962) ("It is agreed by the Employer that the shop or
factory shall not be removed from the County of Philadelphia during the life of this Agree-
ment.").
152. Jack Meilman, 34 Lab. Arb. 771, 773 (1960) (Gray, Arb.). There the contract pro-
vided:
A. During the term of this Agreement the Employer agrees that he shall not,
without the consent of the New York Joint Board, remove or cause to be removed
his present plant or plants from the city or cities in which such plant or plants are
located.
B. During the term of this Agreement the Employer shall not, without the
consent of the New York Joint Board, manufacture garments or cause them to be
manufactured in a factory other than his present factory or factories.
153. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 179, 292 N.Y.S. 898, 901 (Sup.
Ct. 1936). See also Centra Leather Goods Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 804 (1956) (Kheel, Arb.).
154. See text accompanying notes 14-43 supra.
155. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
156. Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 410
(C. Morris ed. 1971).
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contract language preventing unilateral management investment
decisions is to insist on contract language permitting workers to
strike in response. 157
B. Restricting the Quo.- Labor Reserves the Right to Strike Over
Investment Decisions
A second strategy for changing the content of the typical col-
lective bargaining agreement would be to cut back the scope of
labor's no-strike commitment to the extent of management's com-
mitment to arbitrate. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
the scope of an agreement to arbitrate or not to strike depends
entirely on the parties.' 58 If they undertake to submit disputes to
arbitration in lieu of self-help, they "are free to make that promise
as broad or narrow as they wish. . . ." 9 The rights of the parties
are wholly "a matter of contract."' 60 "No obligation to arbitrate a
labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a
party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has con-
tracted to do so. ' 16 I This rhetoric is indispensable to modem
American labor law. The Supreme Court cannot represent the
collective bargaining agreement as being less than a contract vol-
untarily entered. Though at present it may be myth, that image
offers workers the opportunity to control their unions, assert la-
bor's position in the bargaining process, and take the absolute no-
strike clause out of their contracts.
Assume the no-strike clause embodied in the contract reads as
follows: "During the term of this Agreement, neither the Union,
its officers, agents or members, nor any Employee will authorize,
instigate, aid, condone, or engage in a work stoppage or
strike. .... "162 My proposal requires only the following addition:
157. Another critical practical issue is whether local unions will be permitted to seek
innovative language restricting investment decisions, or in the alternative, to revise the no-
strike clause to permit them to strike when such decisions occur. International unions are
likely to believe that either change is too critical to be left to local unions. As a conse-
quence, local unions end up bargaining for the number of bars of soap in the shower room.
In fact, a decision to shut down or relocate a particular plant has localized impact on the
workers employed there. Therefore, they must insist on their right to devise preventive
contract language.
158. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
159. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
160. 363 U.S. at 582.
161. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
162. Agreement between Republic Steel Corp. and United Steelworkers, art. 16, § 1, at
167 (1974).
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"except that the Union and its members remain free to strike over
management decisions which this Agreement does not require the
Company to submit to arbitration."
Suppose this additional language is in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. It leaves the workers free to strike over investment
decisions; but is that right of any use to workers when manage-
ment decides to close a plant? The answer is emphatically yes, for
two reasons. First, in situations where a national union is pre-
pared to act, a management decision to stop operations in one
place can be challenged by strike action at other facilities owned
or operated by the company. This tactic would be ineffective only
where the plant to be closed down was the company's only facil-
ity. Major national unions such as the United Electrical Workers,
Rubber Workers, or Steelworkers could change these manage-
ment decisions rapidly were they prepared to strike the company's
other plants.
Second, aggressive strike action can be effective even if limited
to the locality where management proposes to discontinue produc-
tion. Where the plant contains valuable machinery 63 or an in-
ventory of bulky products partially completed at the time of the
decision," management has capital invested in the facility it
plans to abandon. By threatening to prevent the removal of the
machinery or the products, labor could make the decision to shut
down so expensive that management might be deterred from mak-
ing it. 165
163. See, e.g., Prestige: Workers Go It Alone, AGENOR, Aug. 1976, at 3. This pamphlet
describes a successful sit-in at an American-owned plant in Belgium. On November 24,
1975, representatives of the absentee management informed the workers that the plant
would be shut down on January 31, 1976. On December 9, the employees learned of plans
to dismantle the machinery and ship it to Great Britain. The next day they occupied the
plant. On January 19, the employees decided to resume production and reincorporate as a
new company. On the day production was to resume, police arrived and put seals on the
machines. The workers broke the seals and used the machinery. Local authorities declined
to take legal action.
164. For a description of an effective sit-in in which management had capital invest-
ments in the facility it anticipated abandoning, see Coates, Some Problems of Factory
Occupations, 8 OUR GENERATION No. 3, pt. 1, at 13-16. Coates comments:
"[S]hipbuilding is an unusual industry, in which construction is a long-term affair. Because
capital was heavily committed at the moment of liquidation, the liquidator must strive to
salvage what he can for the. . . creditors." Id. at 14-15. See generally K. Fleet, Crisis on
the Clyde: The Struggle of the Upper Clyde Shipworkers (December 1971) (pamphlet
published by the Research Institute for Social Change (Toronto)).
165. The General Motors strike in 1937 began when management sought to remove
from the Flint plant certain dies which were not produced anywhere else in the country.
The key to the effectiveness of that strike was not so much the occupation of the plant as
the strikers' capacity in or out of the plant to prevent the resumption of production previ-
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C. Conclusion
Faced with the two proposed alternatives, management would
be forced to make a choice. It could preserve the quid pro quo
equation by including among decisions subject to contractual re-
striction and arbitration the investment decisions currently made
unilaterally. Or, it could keep a free hand over investment deci-
sions and allow labor to challenge those decisions by strike action.
By requiring management to make this choice, working people
will no longer be forced to confront plant closure with both hands
tied behind their backs.
ously carried on only in the Flint facility. Although there is some doubt that the die issue
precipitated that strike, S. FINE, Sir-DowN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF
1936-1937, at 144-46 (1969), General Motors' dependence on parts produced in its occu-
pied Flint plants was central to the strike's success. Production plummeted from a pre-
dicted 224,000 automobiles in January 1937 to the 60,000 that were actually assembled.
Moreover, during the first 10 days of February 1937, production throughout the United
States was a mere 151 units. Id. at 209, 303.
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